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The COVID-19 pandemic has in many ways altered life and has affected companies. 
With all the strains on our economy some companies will survive, and others will not have a 
future with the new way of life. There have been some programs to help combat the financial 
difficulties being faced by companies, however this may not be enough to save the companies. 
These financial difficulties and risks faced due to the pandemic could have effects on the 
issuance of going concern opinions, which are issued when there is a concern the business will 
not be able to generate positive returns and meets it obligations in the next year. In addition, the 
risk of financial misstatements is increased due to the changing business environment and the 
changes in the economy that have happened as a result of the pandemic. These changes 
interrupted the accounting cycle for many businesses, and they were forced to adapt. All of these 
factors cause risk of financial misstatements to increase.  
This paper investigates the effects of the pandemic on companies and their ability to 
continue and what factors may influence this. Additionally, it investigates the effect of the 
pandemic on financial misstatements. Both qualitative and quantitative date will be collected and 
analyzed. This data will be collected using Wharton Research Data Services and Audit 
Analytics. The data will then be analyzed in excel. The results provide a better understanding of 
the economy and how it has been affected. It may also provide insights into what business may 







Nature of Going Concern Opinions  
Statements on Auditing Standards No. 59 gives auditors the responsibility to evaluate if 
there is a substantial doubt that an entity will have the ability to continue as a going concern for a 
reasonable period of time. Going concern is the accounting term for a company that has the 
necessary resources to continue operating. In other words, it means that a company has the 
ability to keep their operations going and avoid bankruptcy. These evaluations are made based 
on the procedures during the audit as well as knowledge of existing events and conditions that 
relate to this assumption. Carson, Fargher, Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandan and Willekens (2013) 
find that auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions when companies are less 
profitable, when there is debt default, and when the company has lower liquidity. Companies that 
are less profitable have less money to pay off their liabilities or money to continue investing and 
growing their business. This can lead to the debt default. Additionally, when the company is not 
liquid, they cannot easily obtain cash to pay off their debts leading to a higher risk of bankruptcy 
and therefore it will be more likely that a going concern opinion will be issued.  
Gallizo and Saladrigues (2016) find that the persistence of losses is a major contributor to 
the issuance of a going concern opinion. This puts the continuity of the business at risk. On the 
other hand, they find that the more profitable a business is, the lower the probability they will be 
issued a going concern opinion as they have no losses and therefore no continuity problems. 
Overall, they concluded that the most important indicator to the auditor that there might be a 
going concern issue, is the continued existence of losses and the lack of profitability. This relates 
to the study discussed above. If there is a repeated history of losses, there is a build up of debt 
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that becomes hard and harder to recover from. This would eventually lead to the issuance of a 
going concern opinion and potential bankruptcy for the company involved. 
  Carson et al. (2013) provide the statistics of going concern rates using data obtained 
from Audit Analytics. They sampled 88,359 firm-year observations over an eleven-year period 
from 2000 to 2010. They found that the overall frequency of going concern opinions increased 
from 9.82 percent in 2000 to 13.74 percent in 2001 and 16.57 percent 2002. It is expected that 
there would be more going concern opinions issued during this time period due to the economic 
issues and the tech bubble. After 2002 there was only a marginal increase in the overall 
frequency to 17.01 percent in 2010. Additionally, this study finds that the frequency of going 
concern opinions is far greater for companies with market capitalizations under $75 million at a 
rate of 36.7 percent. This is compared to a rate of 3.66 percent for companies with a market 
capitalization between $75 million and $500 million. For companies with market capitalizations 
above $500 million the rate is only 0.33 percent. This indicates that the size of a firm and the 
likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is adversely related.  
Further, Carson et al. (2013) found that only 15.71 percent of the firms that were issued 
going concern opinions did not file for bankruptcy within a year. This means that it is far more 
likely that a company that is issued a going concern opinion will file for bankruptcy than will 
not. All of this data shows that a going concern opinion is significantly related to the filing of 
bankruptcy within a year of the issuance of the opinion. It also shows that a large and established 
company is much less likely to be issued a going concern opinion, whereas start-up type 
companies and smaller ones are a lot more likely.  
Financial Crisis and Going Concern Opinions 
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The financial crisis that took place in 2007 and 2008 generated more interest in the 
auditor’s reporting on client facing financial difficulties. Many businesses at this time were 
facing increased risks of liquidity as well as credit problems (Carson et al. 2013). This global 
financial crisis also drew attention from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). A study by Geiger, 
Raghunandan and Riccardi (2014) used data from 414 US companies that were financially 
stressed and filed for bankruptcy between 2004 and 2010. They found that “auditors were 
significantly more likely to issue a going concern opinion to a subsequently bankrupt company 
after” the global financial crisis than in the years before it. They also found that both Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 audit firms significantly increased their frequency of issuing going concern opinions 
to companies that would soon go bankrupt. Additionally, they found that auditors were more 
likely to issue going concern opinions to smaller companies than larger ones after this crisis.  
Mareque, López-Corrales and Pedrosa (2017) looked at the financial crisis in Spain in 
2008. Going concern is similar in Spain as it is in the United States. Spanish regulations say that 
the auditor has to apply the provisions of the Standards on Auditing, meaning that they have to 
pay special attention to circumstances that cause doubt to the ability of the firm to continue. 
They analyzed reports over four years from 2007 to 2010. The financial crisis led to an increase 
in business failures and problems with liquidity and credit. Like what happened in the United 
States, this crisis increased the importance of audit reporting and going concern reporting. In 
2010 Spain issued the Green Paper Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis. This Green Paper 
states that “auditors exercise ‘a social and public interest function, absolutely fundamental in a 
democratic economic and political system,’ and underlines the importance of audit reports for 
interested third parties” (Mareque et al. 2017).  
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This study cites prior research, Cheffers, Whalen, and Sielis (2011), from the US stock 
exchange that going concern reports rose from 14.4% in 2003 to 21% in 2008 and 19.4% in 2009 
as well as 18.5% in 2010. The main causes of the increases were identified as recurring loss, 
working capital/current ratio inadequacy, and absence of significant revenues. Mareque et al. 
(2017) found that reports with going concern issues rose from 2.25% in 2007 to 6.77% in 2008 
and 8.5% in 2009. There was a slight fall in 2010 to 7.25%. They also found that in 2009 12.5% 
of the firms who referenced a going concern opinion filed for bankruptcy in 2010, and 7.81% of 
the firms did not present an audit report because they did not meet the requirements established 
in the Law on Auditing of Accounts. These requirements in Spain include if annual turnover is 
less than 5.7 million, the workforce is less than 50, and total assets are less than 2.85 million 
(Accounting and Accounting Rules in Spain 2020). There was also no information on 12.5% of 
the firms. They say that it is important to note that more than half the firms that filed for 
bankruptcy in 2010 did not have a mention of going concern which leads the work of the auditor 
to be called into question (Mareque et al. 2017). This is different from the conclusions drawn by 
Carson et al. (2013) who site the importance of auditors. This could partly be due to the fact that 
these studies took place in different countries with different standards. 
These two studies highlight the impact that financial distress can have on the issuing of 
going concern opinions. The increased financial pressure leads to lower liquidity, lower revenue, 
and therefore an increased risk that the business will not be able to continue. This eventually 
leads to bankruptcy or at least a much worse financial situation. In both cases the percentage of 
going concern opinions being issued increase for several years before decreasing. As expected, 
there was also an increase in bankruptcy filings.  
Impacts of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion 
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  Carson et al. (2013) found that 60.10 percent of firms that were issued going concern 
opinions went bankrupt before the next audit. They also found that 61 percent of auditors 
indicated that an issuance of a going concern opinion could cause unwarranted problems for a 
company. According to Geiger, Raghunandan, and Riccardi (2014) there is something that exists 
known as the “self-fulling” prophecy. This relates to the belief that if a going concern opinion is 
issued it may exacerbate the problems that the company is having. Many auditors are reluctant to 
issue these opinions for fear that it will increase the likelihood that the company will file for 
bankruptcy.  However, auditors should not be reluctant to issue a going concern opinion. They 
should just increase their testing and check their work to ensure the issuance is warranted. 
Vanstraelen (2003) looks at going concern opinions and the self-fulfilling prophecy. Of the 1,176 
companies they surveyed, 17% received a going concern opinion. Of the 17%, only 27% 
survived the first year. With this data, and other data collected, they concluded that the initial and 
repeated going concern opinions increase the likelihood of bankruptcy. The study also finds that 
companies who survive a going concern opinion are significantly more likely to switch auditors 
in the following year.   
Continuing with auditor switching as a consequence for the issuance of a going concern 
opinion, a study by Carey, Geiger, and O’Connell (2008) speaks to just that issue. This study 
took place in Australia and finds that companies that receive a going concern opinion for the first 
time are more likely to switch auditors than companies in a similar financial situation that did not 
receive a going concern opinion. They find that ten of the sixty companies that issued a going 
concern opinion and remained viable switched auditors within a year. In addition, they found that 
smaller firms were more likely to switch auditors which is consistent with prior research. Finally, 
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they found no evidence that Australian companies by “a Big 5 firm are significantly less likely to 
switch auditors than companies audited by non-Big 5 firms” (Carey et al. 2008). 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan (2017) found that capital markets respond negatively to a going 
concern opinion. They found that firms receiving these opinions continue to experience 
significant negative abnormal returns for the month following the announcement. These negative 
returns increase the bankruptcy risk which relates to the study discussed earlier. In some cases, 
these negative returns may not be as bad after the announcement if it was not a surprise. This 
means that if the announcement was inevitable the more severe market reactions would occur 
before the official announcement as opposed to after.  
  Ruiz-Barbadillo and Guiral (2019) draw similar conclusions to the findings above. They 
discuss that it is important to control the stakeholder’s prior expectations when looking at the 
information that is conveyed through a going concern opinion. In many instances a going 
concern opinion can be predicted due to several financial distress indicators. These indicators 
should be able to tell a reasonable stakeholder that the company may not be able to continue for 
the next twelve months. Therefore, the opinion should just be confirming a pattern of the 
financial deterioration and not adding significant information. It can then be concluded that a 
stakeholder’s reaction to the announcement will be dependent on the probability that it will 
occur. If the likelihood of bankruptcy is low based on financial distress indicators, investors 
would not anticipate the issuance of going concern opinions. When they are issued investors 
would react strongly and negatively, reducing the value of the companies. Whether or not this 
information is expected, it can be concluded that there will be a negative market reaction of some 
type.  
Going Concerns and the COVID-19 pandemic 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the world and has changed life as we know in for 
at least the short-term. One of the biggest fallouts has been the financial strains and pressures put 
on companies. This is in part due to customers being confined to their homes due to mandatory 
orders to shelter in place and the forced closure of non-essential businesses. Additionally, with 
the unemployment rate rising, there is less disposable income to be spent. According to 
Accounting Today, many corporate executives will have to consider their ability to generate 
sufficient cash flow that would support their operations. In particular, it will be important to 
consider whether companies can maintain compliance with debt covenants. Auditors will have to 
take these facts into consideration and will have to put extra focus on the estimates and 
judgments supporting managements decisions (Hines and Giese 2020).  
In an article published by the accounting firm BDO, they discuss the impact of the 
pandemic on companies and specifically the issuance of going concern opinions. Under GAAP, 
entities are required to consider going concern and auditors are tasked with evaluating this 
ability. With the impacts of the pandemic this will become exponentially harder. This article says 
that “significant judgment will be required as no two entities’ fact patterns, even if operating in 
the same industry, will be the same. At the end of the day, it will come back to one central 
question – will the company have sufficient cash flows to meet its existing obligations and 
alleviate any conditions that raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going 
concern.” The COVID-19 pandemic has made evaluating this an even more significant challenge 
(BDO 2020). 
Deloitte, one of the Big 4 accounting firms, published an article entitled “Financial; 
Reporting Considerations Related to COVID-19 and an Economic Downturn.” This article 
discusses the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting major financial and economic 
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markets. It cites in particular several industries that were severely affected: travel, hospitality, 
retail, and leisure. Entities, especially ones in these industries, will need to consider whether they 
will have the ability to continue within one year of the date on their interim or annual financial 
statements. The pandemic has put immense pressures on entities and going concern opinions. 
They now have to consider their unique circumstances and their specific risk exposure in order to 
analyze how the recent events will affect financial reporting. Overall, going concern will have to 
be assessed carefully and with “well-reasoned judgements” due to the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic (Deloittee 2020). 
The severity of the pandemic will be mitigated in the short run in some cases. A specific 
case of this is the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) act as well as 
funding that is available through a loan program with the Small Business Administration (SBA). 
The CARES act will provide a source of external funding for management to keep their 
businesses running. According to the SEC, it delays certain payroll taxes until 2021 and 2022, as 
well as eliminating certain net operating losses, permitting carrybacks of net operating losses, 
accelerating the refund schedule for alternative minimum tax credits, and increasing the 
percentage of taxable income that can be offset with deductions of interest expense. The SBA 
will provide money to the most qualifying small businesses in order to cover payroll as well as 
interest on mortgage payments, rent, and utility for the covered time of the loan. If the loan is 
used as intended with the program, it will be forgiven. According to the Journal of Accountancy, 
these efforts may not be enough to alleviate the substantial doubt around going concern. 
Financial Misstatements and the Consequences  
Financial misstatements occur when there are differences between amounts, 
classifications, presentation, or disclosure of an item and what is reported on the financial 
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statements. These misstatements are material when the items on the financial statements are 
incorrect to the point that it will influence the decisions of the users. There are several effects to 
the restating company when a misstatement is issued, the first dealing with the consequences to 
managers after committing GAAP violations. Managers are typically responsible for internal 
controls and because of the fallout from a restatement, managers take the blame. Results in a 
study by Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) showed that earnings restatements are extremely 
costly for managers of the restating companies. In this study they sampled 146 firms that 
announced restatements between 1997 and 1998. They found that at least one senior manager, 
either a Chairman, CEO, or President, lost their job within 24 months of the announcement. This 
was the case in 60 percent of the firms studied. The standard rate of turnover for firms is 35 
percent. This shows a big gap in the percentages even after accounting for other factors like 
management turnover, performance, and bankruptcy.  
Another study examined the effect the accounting restatements on the cost of capital and 
expected future earnings (Hribar and Jenkins 2004). Through this study they found that, for the 
restating company, there are both reductions in future earnings and increases in the cost of 
capital leading to a significant loss in market value. They found that for restating companies in 
the month immediately following the restatement there was, on average, an increase in the cost 
of equity between 7 percent and 19 percent. They also estimated that there was an increase in the 
estimated cost of capital by 7.65 percent. 
Additionally, when examining the stock price of the restating company, the study showed 
that the biggest decline in price occurs within five days of the announcement of the restatement. 
Twenty-five percent of the companies observed loss more than 16 percent of their market value 
over this period to time.  After this initial reaction, the returns typically remain flat for the next 
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60 days. This suggests that the initial reaction was not an overreaction. After these restatements 
there was also repercussions for the forecasted earnings. For the companies observed there was 
an average reduction in the one-year ahead forecasts of approximately 14.7 percent. There was a 
similar result with the two-year ahead forecasts of earnings with the average downward revision 
being 7.8 percent. This shows that some of the effect of the restatement dissipates, but there is a 
long-term market effect to the restating company (Hribar, P., et al. 2004). 
Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang (2006) examines the accounting fraud at a public 
company, ComROAD AG, and one of the biggest international auditors, KPMG. The scandal 
studied involved recognizing false revenues. On February 19, 2002 KPMG effectively resigned 
as auditor by declining its mandate as auditor. KPMG stated that there were justified doubts 
about the trustworthiness of ComROAD. As news came out about the fictitious reporting or 
revenues made by ComROAD, KPMG was in damage control mode. They announced that they 
would re-audit some of its clients in order to affirm their credibility. Additionally, it was found 
that KPMG’s rate of dismissals doubles in 2002 versus the year before. In 2002 the rate was 
found to be 15.7% versus an average of 7.7% for the three prior years.  
Chancey and Kirk (2002) researched the impact the Enron audit failure had on their 
auditor’s reputation, who at the time was Arthur Andersen. As mentioned earlier, an auditor’s 
reputation is very much related to how they are perceived by the outside world. Once the auditor 
quality is jeopardized there is a lower level of assurance that the financial statements actually 
reflect the reality of company. A brief background on Enron begins with the fact that it used to 
be the seventh largest firm in the United States in terms of revenues and was seen as being very 
innovative. It all changed on October 16, 2001, when Enron announced that their third-quarter 
earnings were going to include a nonrecurring charge of $1.01 billion due to accounting errors. 
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After this the Securities and Exchange Commission began to formally investigate Enron’s 
accounting. On October 22 Enron stock dropped 20 percent and from there everything continued 
to spiral downwards. They had understated debt by $711 million in 1997 and $628 million in 
2000. Enron proceeded to dismiss Arthur Anderson.  
 This is an extreme case, but it works well to show the effect of fraud and restatement on 
the auditor’s other clients. Their study showed that on average Arthur Anderson’s clients, other 
than Enron, lost on average $37.1 million over the three days following the announcement. 
While some of their clients did not experience this severe loss, most did. The biggest loss came 
for other clients that were audited by the same Arthur Anderson office as Enron was. When it 
comes to rates of dismissal, only 13 clients in their sample left Arthur Anderson before the 
indictment date, although this is partly due to the fact that 71 percent of the firms use December 
as a year-end basis. Due to this fact, it is unlikely a lot of these firms would switch in the middle 
year due to the high cost of obtaining a new auditor of the clients that dismissed Arthur 
Anderson.  There was a strong negative correlation between the size of the firm and the time at 
which they switched auditors. This study was able to relate these losses directly with the loss of 
reputation for their auditor.  
Overall, there can be several consequences from a financial misstatement. These 
consequences can include the firing of senior managers and an increased rate of turnover as well 
as an increase in the cost of capital and a decrease in future expected earnings. Going along with 
this, there may be a decrease in the stock price of the restating companies. These impacts can be 
shown in several case studies like the ComROAD and Enron cases discussed above.  
Financial Misstatements and the Pandemic 
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The COVID-19 pandemic has affected many different areas in business, including 
financial misstatements. The Journal of Accountancy draws attention to the fact that several 
different areas in accounting, specifically in preparing financial statements, require estimates. It 
is important that these estimates are appropriate and that stakeholders can depend on them and 
trust them. These estimates can be associated with revenue recognition, allowance for doubtful 
accounts, and other similar accounts. These particular accounts are already at risk for financial 
misstatements, but that risk is especially heightened due to the pandemic. A manufacturing 
company can be used as an example for this. Companies typically set a percentage of their credit 
sales that they estimate will be uncollectable. COVID has the potential to impact the ability of 
customers to pay off their account. This will result in the estimate of uncollectable accounts 
needing to be adjusted and could result in a financial misstatement (Dohrer 2020). 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also issued a statement regarding 
COVID-19. In the SEC’s statement they draw similar conclusions to the findings above. They 
acknowledge that the pandemic has drastically impacted businesses of types resulting in issues 
that will inevitably affect financial reporting. Financial misstatements will be a big part of this 
due to changes in businesses and additional uncertainties that the pandemic has caused. Another 
fact that the article points out is that having to change internal controls and the lack of effective 
ones may also contribute to an increased risk of financial misstatement. Having to change 
operations to a work at home operation could have caused internal controls to be not as effective 
or make them harder to enforce and could have created a need for more. An example of this 
would be an increased need for data security controls. Problems with internal controls can also 
be a reason for a misstatement later (SEC 2020).  
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The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board had conversations with audit 
committee chairs relating to COVID-19 and the auditing profession. This was touched on briefly 
by the previous article, but the PCAOB sites cyber-related risks such as email security and 
phishing attempts, at major sources of risk due to the shift to working from home. There is less 
security involved with working from home as well as less internal controls. This gap in 
technology has the potential to leave the door open to more errors and fraud. It is necessary for 
these risks to be considered when assessing the likelihood of a material misstatement of the 
financial statements (PCAOB 2020).  
Research Questions and Predictions: 
This study will examine how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the issuance of going 
concern opinions as well as the likelihood of financial misstatements. The specific research 
questions are:  
• Compared to previous years, has the issuance of going concern opinions and the 
likelihood of financial restatements changed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  
• How does the impact on going concern opinions and financial restatements during the 
pandemic compare to those during the financial crisis?  
• How does the size of a company impact the likelihood of a going concern opinion and 
financial restatements during the COVID-19 pandemic?  
• Have certain industries experienced more going concern opinions or financial 




It is expected that the pandemic has resulted in an increase in going concern opinions and 
financial restatements, particularly in smaller companies and in industries that have been hit 
hard, like the retail industry. Some of this was shown during the financial crisis in different 
companies and industries, but with the COVID pandemic being unlike anything seen before it is 
expected that some of the results will differ.  
Methodology: 
In this study secondary data will be used. This data will be sourced using several tools, 
the first being Audit Analytics, an independent research provider giving access to audit and 
accounting related information. Another tool that will be used to collect secondary data is the 
SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). It is the primary 
system for companies to submit documents and therefore contains millions of company fillings. 
These tools will provide qualitative and quantitative data on companies regarding their filings. 
This study will also use Wharton School’s database, WRDS, to access companies financial 
statement information. Once the data is collected it can be analyzed and cleaned using Excel.  
Results and Discussion: 
Going Concern and Financial Restatements During COVID-19 Pandemic 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of going concern opinions issued by accounting firm. It 
presents going concern data from April of 2020 to September 2020. Comparison data from 2014 
to 2018 over the same months of the year is also presented. For 2020, there were 2641 
observations, of which 373 had going concern opinions attached to them resulting in a 
percentage of 14.1%. This is compared to an average going concern rate of 16.45% from 2010-
2018. Looking at this data further, there is a higher percentage of going concern opinions issued 
from Big 4 auditors than in previous years. Previous years had between 54% and 58% of going 
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concern opinions coming from smaller audit firms, while in 2020 smaller firms account for only 
41%. All the Big 4 accounting firms increased the percentage of going concern opinions they 
issued in 2020, compared to previous years. This is more representative of what is happening in 
the economy than what is shown from the smaller audit firms.  The lower rates in smaller firms 
could also be because they typically face more pressure. Big accounting firms have a more 
diversified client portfolio and more bargaining power and are therefore, not afraid to issued 
going concern opinions (Read & Yezegel, 2016). 
Financial restatements that were announced from April 2020 to August 2020 were also 
analyzed. The data can be found in Table 2. There were 152 observations of financial 
restatements. Of these, 124 were adverse resulting in a percentage of 81.58%. 50 of these 
observations came from companies audited by a Big 4 accounting firm with other large firms 
like BDO and Grant Thornton account for another 20 and 9, respectively. 17.11% of the 
companies that issued a financial restatement switched auditors. Additionally, 76.9% of the 
companies that switched had adverse financial restatements. This can be compared to financial 
restatements from 2014 to 2018 using the same part of the year as is observed in 2020. Data in 
2020 compares similarly to the previous years. The article, “Reacting to COVID-19 in internal 
control over financial reporting”, written and published by Deloitte points out that there are 
several effects of the pandemic that will result in internal control complications. One example of 
this is changes in current technology that are delayed. Companies had to change the way they 
worked very quickly. This left them susceptible to risk as their current technology and internal 
controls did not immediately support the new way of working caused because of the pandemic.  
Comparison of Going Concern Opinions and Restatements in the COVID Pandemic vs. the 
Financial Crisis Periods 
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The Financial Crisis is the period commonly defined as from 2007 to 2008. This period 
of financial difficulties was partly sparked by the collapse of the US housing market. The 
economic problems facing the country now were caused by the global pandemic leading to 
businesses shutting down and higher unemployment rates. Comparing going concern opinions 
during these two time periods will provide interesting insights into the current economic impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Table 3 presents data on going concern opinions from the Financial Crisis. Starting with 
the data from 2007, there were 947 going concern opinions issued and 4142 total opinions for a 
percentage of 17.6%. 57.8% of the going concern opinions came from smaller accounting firms. 
In 2008 there were 965 going concern opinions with 4018 total opinions issued, resulting in a 
percentage of 24%. The percentage of opinions from smaller firms was 40.8%. Compared to the 
current data from the COVID-19 pandemic, the going concern percentage rate is higher. 
Additionally, it is interesting that the going concern opinions filed by smaller companies 
decreases by over 15% from 2007 to 2008. The 57.8% is closer to what is seen in comparison 
years, while the 40.8% from 2008 is very close to what is being seen in 2020. More research can 
be done in the future to see if this percentage decreases more with the fallout from the pandemic. 
It is expected that results during the Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic will differ as 
both affected different areas of the economy. The financial crisis was worsened due to the 
housing crisis which helped to spark the economic downturn. The pandemic on the other hand 
affected the healthcare industries and business/services that profited from in-person interactions, 
like restaurants, cruises, airlines, etc. Another interesting point about the date is that there is a 
high percentage of going concern opinions from BDO and McGladrey in 2007 and 2008, but 
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much lower in 2020. This could be reflective of a change in clientele as both firms went through 
mergers after that time. It could also be as a result of company culture and leadership changes.   
Financial restatements during 2007 and 2008 were also analyzed. Table number 4 
presents this data. It was collected using the same time period of the year as was used when 
analyzing data during 2020 in order to provide an accurate comparison. In 2007 there were 604 
restatements with 546 being adverse for a percentage of 90.4%. Additionally, 30.6% of the 
companies that issued a restatement switched auditors. In 2008 there were 402 restatements with 
369 being adverse for a percentage of 91.8% with 33.8% of the companies switching auditors. 
These results are relatively similar to what is being seen during the pandemic, however, with the 
financial crisis there is a higher percentage of companies with adverse restatements and 
companies that switched auditors. As mentioned earlier, it is expected the financial crisis would 
show more severe results at this point. It takes several years for financial restatements to show so 
more research can be done in the future to see if there is more of an economic impact from the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the future.  
Size and Industry Findings 
Table 5 presents industry data for 2020. Industry is defined using two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. There were 860 companies that had audit opinions with 
industry information. Of these, 53 were issued going concern opinions. The industries with the 
most going concern opinions issued were Chemicals and Allied Products, Business Services, and 
Metal Mining. Some of the industries that saw no going concern opinions included Security and 
Commodity Brokers, Insurance Carriers, and Automotive Dealers and Service Stations. These 
results are to be expected. The Chemicals and Allied Products includes industries that would 
have had to pivot and change production in order to accommodate demand, an example would be 
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drug and pharmaceutical companies. Additionally, the pharmaceuticals and drug industries are 
inherently risky before you factor in the pandemic. In these company’s 10-ks they cite problems 
with supply chains, work from home orders, and delays in their rollout of new products as 
reasons for the going concern opinions. The companies that do not mention the pandemic 
mention things like continuous negative returns. The industries with no going concern opinions 
were not ones that stand out as being affected by the pandemic. The COVID-19 was not the only 
reason for the going concern opinions, but it was a factor that companies had to consider when 
issuing their financial statements.  
In addition to industry, the size of the company was also analyzed to see if there was a 
correlation in whether a smaller company is more likely to have a going concern opinion issued. 
Size was based on market capitalization on 1/1/2021. There were 787 companies in the time 
period analyzed during the pandemic. From Table 6, it is clear to see there is a trend in the data. 
As the company size increases there are less going concern opinions issued. This is expected as 
smaller companies are generally riskier. They typically do not have as much cash on hand and 
are not as established giving them a greater risk of bankruptcy. When looking at the annual 
reports, not every company states the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor in the going concern 
opinion. For the ones that do, there are several reasons that they cite. Sunwin Stevia 
International, Inc mentions interruptions of supply chains, CEL-SCI Corporation says COVID-
19 will have a material adverse effect on their business plan, and Predictive Technology Group, 
Inc mentions delays in the launch of a product due to the pandemic leading to impairment 
changes.  
Industry and size data was also analyzed for financial restatements during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Industry data can be found in Table 7 and size data in Table 8. The industry with the 
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highest number of restatements was Chemicals and Allied products, followed by Business 
Services, and Industrial Machinery and Equipment. The Chemicals and Allied products industry 
include drugs and cleaning supplies, which were in such high demand during the pandemic. I 
conject that these companies had to pivot and adjust and devoted their resources to production 
hence weakening internal controls and increasing their risks for financial misstatements. The 
industries with the least numbers of restatements were Transportation Equipment, Water 
Transportation, and Mining. The data seems to suggest similar industries resulting in a higher 
number of opinions issued and more restatements. This may be because when a company is in 
financial distress the risk if a financial restatement increase. The likelihood of a financial 
restatement also seems to be correlated to size, however, with the small sample size for the 
number of restatements drawing a conclusion on the trend is somewhat speculative.  
Limitations  
There are some limitations to this data. The pandemic is still very recent and the effects 
of it are ongoing, because of this there is not a lot of data within the timeframe available. This 
makes the results less reliable. It is also likely that the economic fallout from the pandemic will 
not be immediate. The government is providing many subsidies for the things like rent as well as 
providing extra money for unemployment and stimulus checks. These things are helping to keep 
the economy afloat, but when they stop there may be a bigger fallout than is currently being 
seen.   
Conclusion 
While the data analyzed does have some limitations, it also provides some interesting 
insights. The data shows an increased going concern opinion percentage from 2018 to 2020. It is 
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evident from observing some of the company’s annual reports that the COVID-19 pandemic 
played a role in this, but it cannot be concluded that it was the reason for all the going concern 
opinions issued. While the financial restatement data did not show a clear impact from the 
pandemic, financial statement data takes longer to become available and could be an area for 
future research. Comparing this data to the financial crisis provided further insight into the data. 
The two time periods had different effects on the economy, but there were similarities. Both 
periods had an increased percentage of going concern opinions from larger accounting firms as 
well as an increased overall going concern percentage rate.  
The data set regarding industry and size was smaller than the original, but still showed 
interesting results. The industry data show similar industries affected the most for both going 
concern opinions and financial restatements. One of the top industries affect was Chemicals and 
Allied Materials. It might be expected that pharmaceutical companies were able to benefit from 
the spotlight on the healthcare industry, when in fact the data shows they did not go unharmed. 
The size data showed a clear picture that as the size of the company increases, the likelihood of a 
going concern opinion decrease. This trend was also shown for financial restatements, but due to 
the small sample size those results may not be as accurate.  More research can be done in the 
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Table 1: Going Concern Opinions During COVID-19 Pandemic 
This table presents data from April 2020 to September 2020 on going concern opinions issued. It also represents data from 2014 to 2018 over the 
same period of the year for comparison purposes. The firms are listed in order of revenue in 2020. The three columns for each year represent the 
number of going concern opinions issued, the total number of opinions issued, and then a percentage calculated by dividing going concern 
opinions by total opinions to give the going concern issuance percentage rate.














































1 379 0.3% 1 348 0.3% 5 332 1.5% 4 337 1.2% 3 339 0.9% 
4 
330 1.2% 
Ernst & Young 
LLP 
2 309 0.6% 4 247 1.6% 3 239 1.3% 4 246 1.6% 7 236 3.0% 
4 
218 1.8% 
KPMG LLP 1 274 0.4% 3 286 1.0% 7 279 2.5% 2 259 0.8% 2 235 0.9% 5 168 2.98% 
RSM US LLP 0 1 0.0% 0 24 0% 2 35 5.7% 1 34 2.9% 1 37 2.7% 0 25 0.0% 
Grant Thornton 
LLP 
2 850 0.2% 0 815 0% 0 722 0% 1 671 0.1% 2 617 0.3% 
6 
422 1.4% 
BDO USA LLP 4 44 9.1% 3 50 6.0% 0 32 0% 9 49 18.4% 7 41 17.1% 3 30 10% 
Moss Adams 
LLP 





2 6 33.33% 0 4 0% 0 4 0% 1 4 25% 2 6 33.3% 
0 
6 0.0% 
Total of Smaller 
Firms 
627 1074 58.4% 553 947 58.4% 480 870 55.2
% 
430 792 54.3% 375 744 50.4% 
345 
827 41.7% 
Total 645 3662 17.6% 566 3400 16.6% 499 3189 15.6
% 





Table 2: Financial Restatement Data During COVID-19 Pandemic 
This table shows financial restatement data from April 2020 to September 2020 as well as data from 2014 
to 2018 over the same part of the year. The first row represents the number of financial restatements. The 
second row is adverse restatements. The third row is the number of companies that switched auditors. The 
fourth row is the number of companies that had both adverse restatements and changed auditors. The 
adverse percentage is calculated as adverse restatements divided by total restatements. The auditor 
changes percentage is calculated as auditor changes divided by restatements. 
Table 3: Going Concern Opinions During 2007 and 2008 Financial Crisis 



















Deloitte & Touche 
LLP 
6 695 0.9% 3 740 0.4% 6 604 1.0% 
PricewaterhouseCoop
ers LLP 
5 398 1.3% 6 365 1.6% 4 330 1.2% 
Ernst & Young LLP 5 474 1.1% 8 438 1.8% 4 218 1.8% 
KPMG LLP 4 317 1.3% 9 265 3.4% 5 168 3.0% 
McGladrey & Pullen 
LLP/RSM USA LLP 
5 31 16.1% 7 32 21.9% 0 25 0.0% 
Grant Thornton LLP 4 585 0.7% 5 621 0.8% 6 422 1.4% 
BDO Seidman 
LLP/BDO USA LLP 
7 59 11.9% 14 52 26.9% 3 30 10.0% 
Moss Adams LLP 0 8 0% 0 6 0% 0 11 0.0% 
CohnReznick LLP 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 6 0.0% 
Total of Smaller 
Firms 
911 1575 57.8% 913 2239 40.8% 345 827 41.7% 
Total 947 4142 17.6% 965 4018 24.0% 373 2641 14.1% 
This table presents data from 2007 and 2008 using the same part of the year as was used for the pandemic 
calculations, April through September. The columns represent the number of going concern opinions 
issued, the total number of opinions issued, and the percentage is calculated by dividing going concern 
opinions issued by total opinions.  
 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2020 
Restatements 365 337 294 262 237 152 
Adverse Restatements 307 277 250 208 191 124 
Total Auditor Changes                    
57  85 72 51 43 26 
Auditor Changes with 
Adverse Restatements 
                  
51  68 61 34 35 20 
Adverse Percentage 84.1% 82.2% 85.0% 79.4% 80.6% 81.6% 
Auditor Changes 




Table 4: Financial Restatements during 2007 and 2008 Financial Crisis 
This table shows restatement data from 2007 and 2008 over the same part of the year as analyzed for the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The first row represents the number of financial restatements. The second row is 
adverse restatements. The third row is the number of companies that switched auditors. The fourth row is 
the number of companies that had both adverse restatements and changed auditors. The adverse 
percentage is calculated as adverse restatements divided by total restatements. The auditor changes 
percentage is calculated as auditor changes divided by restatements. 
 
Table 5: Industry Data for Going Concern Opinions 
Industry Going Concern Opinions Total Opinions Percentage 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 1 1 100.0% 
Furniture and Home furnishing Stores 1 1 100.0% 
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 1 1 100.0% 
Services, NEC 1 1 100.0% 
Social Services 1 1 100.0% 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 1 1 100.0% 
Motion Pictures 5 6 83.3% 
Transportation Services 5 7 71.4% 
Paper and Allied Products 2 3 66.7% 
Metal Mining 26 40 65.0% 
Personal Services 6 10 60.0% 
Coal Mining 10 17 58.8% 
Health Services 4 7 57.1% 
Miscellaneous Retail 16 29 55.2% 
Non-depository Institutions 4 8 50.0% 
Agricultural production- livestock 1 2 50.0% 
Agricultural services 1 2 50.0% 
    
2007 2008 2020 
Restatements 604 402 152 
Adverse Restatements 546 369 124 




Auditor Changes with 
Adverse Restatements 
                  
159  123 
 
20 
Adverse Percentage 90.4% 91.8% 81.6% 
Auditor Changes 





Building Materials and Garden Supplies 1 2 50.0% 
Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service 1 2 50.0% 
Communications  3 7 42.9% 
Engineering and Management Services 7 18 38.9% 
Business Services 43 116 37.1% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 44 121 36.4% 
Amusement and Recreation Services 5 14 35.7% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 3 9 33.3% 
Heavy Contractors 1 3 33.3% 
Trucking and Warehousing 1 3 33.3% 
Holding and Other Investment Offices 4 13 30.8% 
Instruments and Related Products 12 47 25.5% 
Real Estate 6 24 25.0% 
Printing and Publishing 3 12 25.0% 
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 2 8 25.0% 
Food Stores 1 4 25.0% 
Gerneral Merchandise Stores 1 4 25.0% 
Hotels and Other Lodging Places 1 4 25.0% 
Special Trade Contractors 1 4 25.0% 
Transportation by Air 1 4 25.0% 
Transportation Equipment 4 18 22.2% 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 3 15 20.0% 
Agricultural production- crops 1 5 20.0% 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 3 16 18.8% 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 12 65 18.5% 
Furniture and Fixtures 1 6 16.7% 
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 2 13 15.4% 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 5 33 15.2% 
Food and Kindred Products 2 22 9.1% 
Eating and Drinking Places 1 11 9.1% 
Educational Services 1 13 7.7% 
Depository Institutions 1 31 3.2% 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 0 1 0.0% 
Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 0 7 0.0% 
Fabricated Metal Products 0 7 0.0% 
Foreign Governments 0 1 0.0% 
General Building Contractors 0 3 0.0% 
Insurance Carriers 0 4 0.0% 
International Affairs 0 2 0.0% 
Leather & Leather Products 0 1 0.0% 
Lumber and Wood Products 0 1 0.0% 
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Miscellaneous Repair Services 0 1 0.0% 
Nonmetallic Minerals 0 2 0.0% 
Petroleum and Coal Products 0 1 0.0% 
Primary Metal Industries 0 5 0.0% 
Security and Commodity Brokers 0 18 0.0% 
Textile Mill Products 0 2 0.0% 
This table shows industry data during the COVID-19 pandemic. The first column lists the industries, 
classified by the two digit SIC code. The second column is the number of going concern opinions and the 
third is the total number of opinions. The third column is calculated as going concern opinions/total 
opinions.  
 
Table 6: Company Size Data for COVID-19 Pandemic 
Total Opinions Avg Size by Market Cap Going Concern 
Opinions 
% 
157 11 Million 113 72.0% 
157 68 Million 53 33.8% 
157 255 Million 37 23.6% 
157 1 Billion 14 8.9% 
159 53 Billion 5 3.1% 
This table shows company size data from April 2020 to September 2020. The first column the number of 
opinions in each size range. The second shows the average size calculated as price per share times 
outstanding shares. The third column shows the number of going concern opinions in the size range and 





Table 7: 2020 Industry Data for Financial Restatements  
This table shows the number of restatements by industry as well as the number of adverse restatements by 










2020 Restatement Industry Data 
Industry Restatements Adverse 
Restatements 
Chemicals and Allied Products 5 4 
Business Services 4 3 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 4 4 
Coal Mining 2 2 
Depository Institutions 2 2 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 2 3 
Food Stores 2 2 
Instruments and Related Products 2 1 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 1 1 
Eating and Drinking Places 1 0 
Engineering and Management Services 1 1 
Health Services 1 1 
Holding and Other Investment Offices 1 1 
Insurance Carriers 1 1 
Motion Pictures 1 1 
Printing and Publishing 1 0 
Real Estate 1 1 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 1 0 
Transportation Equipment 1 1 
Water Transportation 1 1 
Mining 0 1 
Total 35 31 
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Table 8: 2020 Size Data for Financial Restatements  
 





% # of 
Restatements 
157 11 Million 113 72.0% 0 
157 68 Million 53 33.8% 4 
157 255 Million 37 23.6% 2 
157 1 Billion 14 8.9% 1 
159 53 Billion 5 3.1% 0 
This table shows size, calculated as price per share on 9/04/2020 times current shares outstanding, restatements 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
